letters from the front

I stumbled across this set of remarkably frank (and fairly graphic) interviews on the Guardian website. Well worth a read for a snap-shot of life for some of our finest at the sharp end of things. They appear to have been conducted a couple of months ago at about the same time as the 'RAF - utterly useless' affair (note reference to Maj Jon Swift RRF in the interviews. Jon was also connected with the leaked email thing (bloody fine officer is Jon)):

'We made two mistakes. They punished us'

The men of D Squadron, Household Cavalry, recently returned from a six month deployment in Afghanistan during which they were embroiled in some of the fiercest fighting since the Korean war. At times they spent weeks under attack defending 'platoon houses' in the remote towns of Sangin, Musah Qaleh and Nowzad

Interviews by Audrey Gillan
Saturday November 18, 2006
The Guardian


Lance Corporal of Horse George Sampson, 25, from the New Forest, eight years service

"It was a real 360 degree battlefield out there. You never know where it is going to come from. The Taliban are quite good at getting behind you. Snap ambushes are what they are good at. We were getting dicked [informed on] all the time. They use a cordless phonewith a 30km range on it. As soon as we left somewhere and went anywhere, they knew about it.

"Their network was awesome and it aided them in laying ambushes and IEDs [improvised explosive devices]. We are lucky that they are not literate or numerate. We could listen on our net and they would say they could see 150 tanks turning up in an hour and it would be our squadron of 20 vehicles.

"We were told that they were shit hot anyway because they had been fighting for the last fuck knows how long. They have always fought massive formations. Their SOPs [standard operating procedures] are really good. They attack you when you are least expecting it. We made two mistakes and they punished us for that. The first was in Musa Qaleh. The mistake was moving into the town, we should have had support. If the Danes weren't such spineless fuckers people might still be alive. The reason we had to go down there in the first place was because they refused to come out of their camp to get a resupply. The second time we left the gunline at Musa Qaleh and were going to Nowzad. It was as if they were waiting for us.

"I don't think a great deal of the RAF. The Americans are more on side, dropping bombs and using their helicopter assets - they are more willing to help you. The RAF have to be pushed into it. The British are too reluctant to fire. There were instances when they just wouldn't engage targets when our guys were getting shot at - they apologised for that. It was difficult trying to keep your boys going with people around who aren't 100% flat out going for it. It just pisses everyone off. I just don't think anyone had said anything about the RAF before and it came to a point where everyone had had their tits full."

Corporal of Horse Mick Flynn, 46, from Cardiff, 18 years service, interrupted by an eight-year gap

"We had to go forward and provide an overwatch on the district centre at Musa Qaleh so that the Danish could come out of their camp. I was in the lead vehicle and the vehicle directly behind me got blown up. I had driven over the IED, they let me past and blew up the vehicle behind me. I was then trapped and they fired numerous rockets at us. Three RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] hit us and one went over the top. We took out the machinegun posts to the front of us and killed them. The Taliban's main killing group was probably about 10 metres away. There was about 20 or 30 of them. I made a decision to go on through the ambush and I looked behind and saw that there was a lot of smoke coming from the vehicle behind. We turned round and went through the ambush firing phosphorous grenades at them. The bar armour which protected the vehicle had been hit so we had to dismount. The Taliban were coming down the lane towards us. We killed three of them, but the rest kept firing. We had to fight our way along then jump in a ditch.

"I checked the vehicle behind me. Inside I could see one body. The one outside was blown up and was just a mass of meat. It was just another dead body. Without trying to sound callous, I don't have any feelings. I think I have become immune to it. You can't, they are finished, that's it. I just accept that they are dead. Obviously it went through my brain, but my main issue was to get the other two guys out of there alive. My driver was having problems and I said we have to move otherwise they are going to kill us.

"Radders [Lance Corporal of Horse Andrew Radford] came and said there was a body on top of the hill. I said 'why don't you shoot it?' and he said 'no, it's one of ours'. We made our way to the body. I could see it was one of the lads. I thought he was dead, but as I moved his leg, which was jutting out at an angle, he screamed. When I first looked at him he had fish eyes and I thought he was dead. I threw him on to Radders' shoulders and we shot our way back. He was really badly burnt, he had 80% burns. There was a lot of other Taliban coming down to cut us off. We had left two vehicles on the overwatch 1/2 mile away and they engaged the Taliban.

"I could only account for three bodies. I couldn't see the other body. I talked to the Paras and they sent a company to give us support and to get the bodies out. Because I knew where the positions of the bodies were I was asked if I could lead the Paras back in. We still had one body unaccounted for. You have to go back for him. You can't just leave somebody there. There was no question about us not going back. The Paras then formed up and brought in lots of fire and artillery. We pushed forward and cleared their positions with grenades. This is our job. It is what we do for a living."

Lance Corporal Paul Gallagher, 24, from Liverpool, eight years service

"The attacks were constant, two or three times a day, 107mm rockets were the most common ones and mortars. The supplies were far too slow. The officer commanding of the RRF [Royal Regiment of Fusiliers] Major [Jon] Swift was always asking for supplies but we weren't always the main priority. We were dug in in Nowzad and we felt like sitting ducks at times. We asked for protection and we were told we would have to wait a couple of weeks because of logistical problems. Whole rounds were going off over your head. It was such a constant bombardment of attacks it became normal.

"Things change a lot more being under constant barrage. When you are getting shot at you know where it's coming from but when someone fires mortars you have got to run into shelters and hope it doesn't hit you. We got a serious amount of kills and that. It was quite shocking for us. The Afghan national police went to collect the bodies and there were more than 100. Major Swift was strict about when we could engage because he was concerned about collateral damage. We never got any comeback on accidental kills.

"I lost my best mate when we were out there. [Lance Corporal] Sean Tansey. We were all devastated. The worst thing was that it was an accident. A jacking strut snapped while he was under a vehicle fixing it. That affected some of the younger lads but in the end everyone just got on with their jobs. No one had time to stand back and think about it."

Lieutenant Toby Glover, 25, from Guildford, Surrey, three years service

"The Taliban is a force to be reckoned with. They are unbelievably tenacious and they do have access to a whole range of equipment.

"You don't know who your enemy is. One minute they will be walking down the street and have a woman and children surrounding them and the next the woman and children will disappear and he will be firing at you. They were masters of using the art of cover. Very rarely did you see them. It was very much a case of harassing fire from them.

"I can't stress enough that the tenacity of the Taliban was incredible. One time we went into Sangin and the Paras were doing their bit on the ground and were constantly under attack from the Taliban position. They must have known their time was up, we had Apache air and ground forces and yet they still attacked and attacked and they were certainly killed as a result. They either had balls or madness to stay and fight. The problem is you don't know if you kill one Taliban whether you will reap many more.

"I reckon in Afghanistan we can achieve something if we have the right resources and the correct manpower. On the tour that we did, we were overstretched. We found ourselves fixed in positions which meant we couldn't do all the manoeuvres we liked. If we got the resources it could certainly be a success story."