British COIN Doctrine (it's the way ahead)
COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (COIN)
The British Army has for over 100 years been involved with insurgency of one type or another (Palestine 1946-47, Malaya 1948-60, Kenya 1952-60, Cyprus 1955-58, Aden 1963-67, Sarawak 1964, Dhofar 1965-75 etc) and from this experience has evolved a practical doctrine for counter-insurgency. No one can forecast what future situation British forces may have to face at home and abroad. While each new threat arises in its own context to present a fresh set of problems, there are certain operational principles that remain valid for countering any type of insurgency acts of terrorism or civil disorder.
The three broad fundamentals of doctrine developed and adapted by the British for counter-insurgency, that is minimum force, civil/military co-operation and tactical flexibility, also provide an essential backdrop for newer and more recent forms of peace support operations. The way in which these fundamentals are applied would have to be adjusted to suit the particular circumstances, but it is apposite to note that the experience gained by the British Army from previous counter insurgency campaigns should not be forgotten or overlooked when considering other types of operations.
Service in Northern Ireland has also provided many in the Army with basic experience at tactical level but this could tend to constrain military thinking on the subject because of its national context. There are many military lessons that can be learnt because of the similarities between the MACP* campaign in Northern Ireland and other COIN campaigns which have been conducted elsewhere. But there are also significant differences. Tactics, such as cordon and search operations and some forms of convoy anti-ambush drills, which from the perspective of Northern Ireland, may seem to be relics of a colonial past, could well be very relevant and necessary in a different operational and environmental setting.
The British have not developed a general antidote to the problem of insurgency but have made use of guidelines and practices to conduct counter insurgency operations which includes counter terrorist action. Not only is the threat changing, but so too is the environment in which an insurgent has to be confronted. For example, as in all future military operations, military action will be conducted under the critical scrutiny of the law, the media, human rights organisations and other international bodies such as the European Court. This will be particularly so for COIN operations where the media organisations will inevitably have wider access to the Civil Authorities and the general public.
It is necessary to appreciate that although military forces may have a crucial role to play in restoring and maintaining government control, military force is not an end in itself, but always a means to achieve a wider political purpose. This implies that the military commander will have a far from free hand, and indeed, in a well orchestrated COIN strategy, is unlikely to direct the overall campaign. Acceptance of this fact has deep implications for the part that military forces will be given (and should seek) to play in COIN, and of any military approach to the situation.
Source:
DGD&D/18/34/66 (1998) ‘The Application of Force’ (unrestricted)
*MACP - Military Assistance to the Civil Powers
posted by Nick Dymond @ 13:37
3 comments
3 Comments:
A useful reminder!
Interesting bit about operations in the future being conducted under the critical scutiny of the law. Quite so and quite right! Could it be anything otherwise in the British Army of today? Only problem is whose law? "National" and/or "International Law" and if the latter then who defines it, who upholds it and what "teeth has it got?
The other thing that I always remember about COIN was the "hearts and minds" issue. Of course, in Vietnam this was always going to be a problem for the U.S. i.e. whose hearts and minds and how to identify them.
Pip
Martin Van Creveld has called Low-Intensity Conflict 'Lawyer-Intensive Conflict'. I think that he is quite right. Assuming that you both agree I wonder how you think that this squares with the ideal of mission command?
Mission command is an intrinsic part of manoeuvrist doctrine. ie, when employed correctly (or at all) it enables initiative (initiative is generally regarded as being a good thing these days).
Van Crefeld's idea reminds me that the British Army retains its integrity through a number of different means. One principle means is that of the 'military covenant'. This is a device that is predicated upon the understanding that, prior to making the decion to let slip the gods of war, one should be aware of the consequenses of doing so. Low intensity conflict should not be considered as a sport that is undertaken by war-fighting machinery when it has nothing better to do. Any military deployment should be a deliberate and 'with predudice' decision. Armies are equipped and trained for their potential to break things and kill people. Along with physical capability, much of an Army's potential is predicated upon credibility. The maintenance of credibility is of paramount importance. The bottom line is that you should not deploy the Army as a bluff. If one cannot stomach the idea that people may get killed and stuff might get broken, then you shouldnt be deploying military force. The military covenant suggests that, when a soldier is required to do what he is trained to do, he/she will enjoy a level of support from the chain of command that is appropriate.
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